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Abstract: Over the course of a single lifetime Saudi Arabia went from being a minor 
kingdom in Arabia to one of the largest geopolitical actors on the globe. But how did this 
happen? What made it happen so quickly? What are the repercussions of such a fast rise to 
prominence? This thesis argues that the success of Saudi Arabia was largely due to Ibn 
Saud’s ability to rally the Ikhwan, a group of religiously motivated warriors, as his personal 
army in the early days of his reign. By using these warriors, Ibn Saud also inadvertently 
created the largest threat that Saudi Arabia faces today:  militarized Wahhabism. 
This paper looks at the life of Ibn Saud, the rise of the Ikhwan, and details how the 
Ikhwan eventually turned against their creator. Finally this paper explores how the Ikhwan 
continued to exist after their failed rebellion against the Saudi Kingdom and how that defeat 
led to the Siege of the Great Mosque of Mecca in 1979.1 
                                                 
1 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect 
the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be 
construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or 
endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed for classification and 
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After the tragic events of September 11th, the Saudi government did much to distance 
itself from Osama Bin Laden and the terrorists who attacked the United States. They claimed 
“this mingling of violence with religion was an un-Saudi aberration.”2 This was a familiar claim 
as it was repeated almost verbatim twenty years earlier when the Grand Mosque of Mecca was 
besieged and overtaken by a group of radical Wahhabis. Here too, the government claimed, these 
men and women, their violence, and their faith were the exception, not the rule.  
But was it an aberration? Saudi Arabia seems to be defined by abnormalities. Over the 
course of a single lifetime, Saudi Arabia went from a dream in the imagination of a child to a 
kingdom able to shift the global economy on its whim, allied to the most powerful nation on 
earth. So what happened? How did this nation rise so quickly? How did it gain the interests of 
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and even the Third Reich? Was Osama Bin 
Laden truly a deviation from Saudi culture or was he a byproduct of Saudi Arabia’s formation? 
One that Saudi Arabia must contend with daily to ensure its own survival? 
I argue that Osama Bin Laden and radical Islam is not an “Un-Saudi aberration.” I believe 
Ibn Saud’s history as a Bedouin leader and his creation of the Ikwhan allowed him to unify the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, in doing so, Ibn Saud paradoxically created the greatest 
threat the Kingdom has faced to date: militarized Wahhabism.  
I use the term “militarized Wahhabism” as opposed to militant Wahhabism or radicalized or 
any of the other more commonly used terms for a very intentional reason. I believe previous 
terms have not done justice to the levels of organization that these groups possess. As you will 
read, Juhayman and his followers trained regularly with marksmanship and discipline drills and 
                                                 




the groups that Saudi Arabia currently faces are organized to such an extent as to have their own 
regimented training camps and rank structures. By calling these organizations militarized I try to 
address this level of organization and recognize it for the threat that it presents. 
In order to justify such a large claim, I have divided this paper into three chapters. The first 
chapter details the early life of Ibn Saud, and his connection with Wahhabism. Here I will show 
that Ibn Saud’s time spent living with the Bedouin, and specifically learning their practice of 
Ghazou or raiding, informed the tactics of his desert warriors, the Ikhwan and later his leadership 
style as a statesman and a general. I also claim that living in such austere conditions served as a 
rigorous type of military conditioning for Ibn Saud that made him an ideal leader for such a 
religiously charged fighting force. I also demonstrate how Ibn Saud’s time in other areas such as 
Kuwait influenced Ibn Saud’s life.  Specifically I show that it was from his family’s friend 
Mubarak that Ibn Saud learned the value of western powers in his local political scene and 
learned how to exploit global politics in order to achieve his own ends. 
Next, I will address Ibn Saud’s connection to Wahhabism. First I will provide a brief history 
of Wahhabism: where it came from, what it meant to its founders and what it means to its 
practitioners today and in the time of Ibn Saud. I will show how Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab, 
years after his own life, instilled a very unique and distinct set of cultural values in Ibn Saud that 
he used to unify Saudi Arabia against his rivals. Through building that distinctive culture, Ibn 
Saud cursed the future rulers of his kingdom to have to contend with an incredibly powerful and 
at times violent religious extremism that Saudi Arabia still battles with today. 
In my second chapter I look at Ibn Saud’s early conquests and the primary reason for his 
early successes in Arabia: the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud’s paramilitary force. I argue that Ibn Saud used 




soldiers Ibn Saud was able to conquer what is now the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia much faster, 
but that cost him and his new country dearly as he had to call in British soldiers and air support 
in order to finally put down the Ikhwan. By martyring these religious zealots in a battle that 
many describe as a massacre that Ibn Saud transitioned his kingdom away from its Wahhabi 
roots, but without addressing the cultural core of religious extremism these Ikhwan represented. 
In my third chapter I will discuss Saudi Arabia after the life of Ibn Saud. The discovery of 
oil, Ibn Saud’s habit of doting on his children and the overall habits of generosity learned from 
his Bedouin past ensured that his children never wanted for any luxury. However, they had never 
learned the habits of moderation that come from years of living in a desert. All of these things 
compiled to create a much less disciplined royal family  
I claim that these royal habits of often publicized luxury mixed poorly with the unity from on 
Wahhabism base that Ibn Saud had built in his unification of the many kingdoms of Arabia. At 
times this base would recognize the incongruence between their lifestyles and that of their 
leadership and occasionally expressed their discontent through rebellion. And while these 
periodic uprisings were usually swiftly and effectively dealt with by the Saudi State, they 
eventually resulted in the 1970s siege of the great mosque of Mecca. I argue that this siege and 
its combatants were directly related to the culture cultivated by Ibn Saud’s Ikhwan. I also argue 
ending the siege did not come easily for the Saudi family and it ultimately resulted in the Saudi 
government sharing power with their country’s religious leaders to an extend that was previously 
unprecedented. 
Through these acts, the Saudi government assured its survival, but did so at a great cost. 
From that point forward, Saudi Arabia would have to deal with a religious zealotry that would 




move forward? How do they reverse the trend of Wahhabism? How do they fight against a 





Chapter 1. The Early Life of Ibn Saud 
I. Ibn Saud’s Flight from Riyadh 
After a failed rebellion in early 1890, Ibn Saud’s father Abdul Rahman received news that his 
family’s historic enemy, the Rashids, were coming with an army of men to end the Saudi 
dynasty. Knowing the town they inhabited was unwilling to undergo a siege, Abdul Rahman, 
decided to flee. In the dead of night, the Saud family, their retainers, and a train of camels fled 
from the Rashids. Ibn Saud, eight years old and placed in a saddle bag next to his nine year old 
Sister, Noura, listened to the deafening silence of their escape while his aunt whispered to him 
“Thou must revive the glory of the House of Ibn Saud, O Azayyiz. And even the glory of the 
House of Ibn Saud must not be the end of thy endeavors. Thou must strive for the glory of Islam. 
Thy people sorely need a leader who will guide them in the path of the Holy Prophet- and thou 
shalt be that leader.”3  
While an estimated 27 million individuals live in Saudi Arabia, none of them were more 
influential to the Kingdom than Ibn Saud. His history as a warrior influenced the early 
diplomatic choices of Saudi Arabia and his tendencies towards proliferation, fathering over 90 
children, created an entire new class of elite citizenship: the Saudi family. This new class of 
citizen still benefits from Ibn Saud’s traditions of spoiling his guests and family members with 
lavish gifts; a tradition of generosity that continues even after his death.4 So if we seek to 
understand how Saudi Arabia came to be, we must first look into the life of Ibn Saud. Where he 
learned to fight, where he learned to rule, and most importantly where he learned to lead. 
                                                 
3 Darlow, Michael, and Barbara Bray. Ibn Saud: the desert warrior who created the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. New 
York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015. 57 




Ibn Saud’s father Abdul Rahman played with Arabian politics and lost. A minor emir over an 
area known as Nejd in what is now Saudi Arabia.5 Abdul Rahman, and many other Arabian 
leaders chaffed against the rule of the Ottoman Empire and their most favored family, the 
Rashids. Abdul Rahman first raised his flag in rebellion against the Rashids. While initially 
somewhat successful, the Rashids came after the Saudi family in their capital, Riyadh. Seeing the 
Saudi family hidden behind Riyadh’s walls the Rashids set in for a long siege, pillaging the 
country side and burning many of their date trees. Abdul Rahman, with knowledge of the 
approaching Rashidi forces ensured that the city was well stocked with supplies.6 
Eventually, with its stockpiles nearly exhausted the Rashidi forces, unused to siege warfare, 
and facing the increasing heat of the desert summer decided to end the siege and return home. 
The Saudi family was successful, but at great cost. The town’s supplies were almost entirely 
exhausted and rebuilding would take quite some time. Fearing a second siege, Abdul Rahman 
capitulated with the Ottoman Empire who allowed him to stay as a ruler of Riyadh but under the 
careful watch of a Rashidi governor.7 
After a short while, Abdul Rahman’s sources told him of the Rashidi governor’s plan to 
attack him and his family during an upcoming official visit. Once the Saudi family had settled 
inside the governor’s guest room, the Rashids would give a signal and fall upon Abdul Rahman, 
his wives and Ibn Saud ending the Saudi line forever. Now armed with this information, Abdul 
Rahman hatched a plan of his own. Sneaking weapons into the governor’s house they were able 
attack the governor’s forces before his signal was given. The fighting was bloody and fierce but 
Abdul Rahman’s forces were victorious.8 
                                                 
5 Armstrong, H. C. Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998. 22-25 
6 Darlow 50 
7 Ibid 53-55 




While he was too young to participate in the fighting, this was Ibn Saud’s first experience 
with violence. He learned the value of deception in warfare and the strength of intelligence in 
ruling. While not immediately applicable Ibn Saud carried these lessons with him into his later 
life as ruler of Saudi Arabia. 
After the fight and deposing of the Rashidi governor, Abdul Rahman understood that he was 
now in full rebellion again. Luckily, other emirates had also raised up arms against the Rashids 
and Abdul Rahman sought to join them. He heard the rebel’s fighters were gathering and sent his 
own warriors to join them with himself at the front. However, the Rashids met and defeated the 
other rebel forces before Abdul Rahman could join them effectively ending the rebellion. As 
soon as he heard of the defeat and the rebellion’s end, Abdul Rahman returned to Riyadh to 
prepare for another siege. 9 
Still reeling from their last conflict and in a region that rarely used siege warfare, the city of 
Riyadh knew they could not withstand another siege. They went to Abdul Rahman and asked 
him and his family to leave. They would, again, acquiesce to Ottoman rule but without the 
rebellion’s leaders the city and its inhabitants would be spared. Seeing flight as their only option, 
Abdul Rahman gathered his family and his belongings and in the dead of night fled from the 
approaching Rashid and Ottoman forces.10 
II. Ibn Saud’s Life among the Bedouin 
Ibn Saud’s childhood flight from the Rashids would have immeasurable impact upon his 
personality. His family, unable to stay in large settlements or near traditional watering holes as 
those areas risked detection and certain death, relied on the hospitality of the Bedouin. The rules 
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of Bedouin hospitality dictated that if a man and his family touched the corners of your tent, you 
were then obligated to open your home to them, protect them, and offer all you had for three 
days. After which, the host would inquire as to his host’s plans an indirect way of telling his 
guest it was time to leave. 
 The deserts of Arabia are a harsh and unforgiving environment, and this tradition developed 
as a means of mutually assured protection and survival. Anyone could call upon these traditions, 
and all would be honored. And the Saud family lived in this fashion, traveling from Bedouin tent 
to Bedouin tent for years. All the while, Ibn Saud studied his hosts and learned to live among 
them.11  
During his time among the Bedouin, Ibn Saud learned about the practice of the Ghazou or 
raiding. The raiding tribe would gather their men and sneak up to an opposing Bedouin tribe or 
trading caravan. The raiders would then sneak as close as they could and then, after giving a 
predetermined signal the raiders would all jump up, shoot their guns and create such loud violent 
noises as to scare their victims. The raiders were careful to avoid causalities as deaths could 
often lead to a near never ending cycle of blood feuding. Instead, the object was to distract and 
scare rather than kill. The raiders would then attempt to gather what they could from their 
enemy’s camp and run off into the desert with their stolen camels, weapons, and food.12 
This tradition was widely practiced and highly regulated. Raiders did not kill during the 
Ghazou and they were also careful not to leave the raided camp with too little to survive. If a 
raider was captured, he was often treated as a guest with tea and a meal before being given 
enough food and water to survive his journey back to his tribe, although his weapon and his 
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camel became property of his captors. The Ghazou was a rite of passage for many young 
Bedouin men and often, one earned his masculinity and right to marry on the completion of a 
successful Ghazou.13 
As Ibn Saud grew, he participated in Ghazous of his own. He established relationships that 
he would call upon later in his life and learned valuable lessons about combat and military 
leadership that he would use throughout his conquest of the kingdom. And most importantly he 
learned how to lead men and learned about the three most important traits that a Bedouin leader: 
bravery, generosity, and luck14 
Ibn Saud’s time in the desert was extremely important to the construction of his character. In 
the desert he found a way of life that would have been utterly cut off from him had he stayed in 
Riyadh. He saw the strength of Bedouin women who often rode unveiled and participated in 
celebrations, dancing and singing (acts that would be entirely uncouth for a Najd woman in 
Riyadh.) And even late into his life Ibn Saud would remark on the quality of the Bedouin. All the 
way through until the end of his life, Ibn Saud would seek out the desert and the Bedouin when 
he wanted to escape the pressures of ruling. Ibn Saud would always look back at this time of his 
life with a fondness and reverence second only to that of his god. 
 He admired how these people had lived for countless years in such harsh conditions by 
choice. He admired how the Bedouin understood that settling in the cities meant surrendering 
their freedoms, something they were totally unwilling to do. And most importantly he admired 
the quality of their character. “Even today there is no Arab, however sophisticated, who would 
not proudly claim Bedu lineage. I shall always remember how often I was humbled by my 
                                                 
13 Lacey 70 




illiterate companions, who possessed in so much greater measure generosity, courage, 
endurance, patience, good temper and light-hearted gallantry.”15 
III. Ibn Saud’s Time in Kuwait 
After spending a great deal of time among the Bedouin, Ibn Saud and his family eventually 
wore out their welcome with the desert nomads. They then started to rely on their more powerful 
contacts. Around 1893, the Saud family first moved to Qatar only briefly staying with an Emir 
there. Two months later they then moved to Bahrain again for only a brief while. While these 
emirates provided a brief respite, the rulers were unable to take in the Saud family for very long 
as they were afraid of angering the Rashids or worse, the Ottomans. However, in 1894 the 
Ottoman Empire eventually became somewhat concerned with the growing strength of the 
Rashid family. Not entirely willing to release their most loyal family but still a bit concerned at 
becoming too reliant on them, the Ottomans started to empower other families in order to keep 
the Rashids in check. Thankfully, the Sauds were one of those families. 16 
The Ottomans hoped that a strengthened Saudi family would keep the Rashids busy and in 
order to facilitate this they left the other major royal families know that the Empire would not 
object if someone took in the al-Saud family. Sheikh Muhammad, then the ruler of Kuwait, saw 
the opportunity and offered safety to the fleeing Saudi family. 17 
The port city of Kuwait was quite jarring for a young Ibn Saud. Far more populous and wild 
than his home city of Riyadh and starkly different from the Bedouin camps of his most recent 
years, Ibn Saud was totally out of his element. But even in this foreign environment he never lost 
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track of his purpose. He was going to retake Riyadh and reinstall himself and his family as the 
rulers of Nejd. 18 
Kuwait was a city of vices, totally unfamiliar to a young man who had spent most of his life 
in the Spartan conditions of the desert. The city was filled with brothels, opium dens and other 
such distractions and it was in Kuwait that Ibn Saud met and befriended Mubarak, the half-
brother of the Sheikh of Kuwait. 
 Mubarak was the opposite of his austere brother on Kuwait’s throne. Mubarak had fought 
with the Sheikh early in his life and had left Kuwait to Bombay where he had wasted all of his 
wealth on alcohol, prostitutes and drugs.19 He eventually returned to Kuwait, a pauper, with 
intentions of retaking the throne from his half-brother. While it is unclear if Mubarak sought Ibn 
Saud out as a part of a power grab or if he simply found a source of empathy in another deposed 
monarch what is clear is that something in Ibn Saud appealed to Mubarak.  
 He found tutors for Ibn Saud making sure he learned mathematics, geography, and 
English. Mubarak’s tendency towards drinking, smoking, and other more earthly delights 
certainly displeased Ibn Saud’s father. But Abdul Rahman saw that potential that Mubarak had 
and did not move to stop his influence. Instead, he called in a religious scholar of his own in 
order to make sure that Ibn Saud balanced the mathematics and English with a healthy dose of 
Wahhabism.20 
 After a few years of working with Ibn Saud, Mubarak saw his opportunity to claim the 
throne of Kuwait. After receiving secret assurances from the English, he rose up and deposed his 
half-brother sending his sons and the rest of his family fleeing.  Understanding that he had upset 
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the balance of power in the region and potentially rebelled against the Ottomans, Mubarak made 
sure to pledge loyalty to the Ottoman sultanate and continue to flag the Empire’s flag on his port. 
However, the Ottoman Sultan said nothing for over a year and half. 21 
 Mubarak’s new position of power meant that Abdul Rahman would have an even harder 
time counter-balancing Mubarak’s influence. And Mubarak gained and even stronger hold over 
Ibn Saud during this time as well. He allowed Ibn Saud into his courts and taught him everything 
he could about state craft. From Mubarak Ibn Saud learned the importance of regional politics. 
He saw the speed with which Mubarak raised the Ottoman flag and asked to become the 
appointed governor of Kuwait. He also saw how, after the Sultan did not respond, Mubarak sent 
out secret envoys seeking the support of other great powers.  
 These Envoys proved invaluable when Mubarak heard about an Ottoman forces 
approaching to depose him as ruler of Kuwait. Mubarak sent out desperate pleas for support to 
the British Empire who then sent a warship as an “observer” of any potential conflict. The 
presence of this warship was enough to give the fading Ottoman Empire pause. They withdrew 
their forces and recognized the legitimacy of Mubarak.22 
 From his special position of privilege within Mubarak’s court, Ibn Saud was able to see 
the interplay between great power and regional politics. He saw how Mubarak consistently 
played the great powers against one another, a lesson he would use throughout his own statecraft. 
And Ibn Saud saw the importance of displays of loyalty even in the face of open rebellion. 
Finally, Ibn Saud also noticed the flagging power of the Ottoman Empire. He saw how easily 
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deterred his monarch’s forces were and in the Ottoman’s weakness he also saw the weakness of 
his enemies, the Rashids.23 
IV. Wahhabism 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Ibn Saud’s upbringing was the influence Wahhabism, 
the branch of puritanical Islam taught to Ibn Saud by his father. Wahhabism is an extremely 
conservative interpretation of Islam. It was founded by Mohammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 
mid-1700s.24 A religiously devout young man, Ibn Wahhab had spent the better part of his early 
life studying under various Muslim Sheikhs in an attempt to fully understand God’s words. 
Taking a strict interpretation of the Quran and a quotation from the prophet which favored his 
generation and the preceding two above all other generations, Ibn Wahhab preached for a return 
to what he believed was the original Islam. He strongly advocated for a very literal interpretation 
of the Quran and the Hadith (stories recorded of the Prophet’s life) and if an activity was 
explicitly permitted in one of those texts then it was obviously forbidden. Ibn Wahhab saw 
heresy everywhere he went, and much to the chagrin of his followers, he banned any activity that 
he felt was remotely against his teachings. What was a grave of a well-regarded ancestor to a 
local was a false idol being worshipped to Ibn Wahhab. Dancing was adulterous and smoking 
was as forbidden as drinking. “He attacked all forms of corruption, bribery, hypocrisy, and 
oppression. The remedy for the current, essentially social-political ills of Al-Uyaynah and the 
wider Najd (central Saudi Arabia) was a return to strict adherence to Islam’s fundamental 
founding principles.”25  
                                                 
23 Ibid 48-52 
24 DeLong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam from revival and reform to global Jihad. Riyadh: International Islamic 
Publ. House, 2010. 




Most importantly though, was Ibn Wahhab’s intolerance of other Muslims. Because he was 
so rigid in his interpretation of Islamic texts he reasoned that any form of Islam that did not 
conform with his teachings was heretical. As with most religious movements, it became 
incumbent upon the followers to proselytize their “rightly-guided” version of Islam. 
Unfortunately though, because of Ibn Wahhab’s belief that those not conforming to his faith 
were heretical it permitted his followers to spread his faith by any means necessary, including 
force. 
It should be noted here how far most of Ibn Wahhab’s teachings spread from actual orthodox 
Islam. Not only is the Wahhabi interpretation of Jihad as a personal duty incumbent upon all 
Muslims historically unsound, but their continued rejection of alternate forms of Islam is also 
totally unorthodox within Islamic theology. While it’s impossible to claim that groups like the 
Shi’a and the Sunni have not had their historical differences, few would go so far as to call one 
group heretical (as the Wahhabis do to the Shi’a.)  
While his message was initially well received, al-Wahhab quickly made enemies when he 
burned, in the name of heresy, a number of “sacred trees” that locals would hang trinkets on for 
good luck. He then moved on to destroy tombs of the original companions of Mohammad and 
any other object that he felt detracted from the worship of God and God alone. This greatly upset 
the locals, both the rich who profited from the tourism that such sites brought in and the poor 
who believed in their religious power.  These groups eventually rose up against al-Wahhab and 
his followers and forcibly removed them sending them fleeing into the deserts of Arabia. 
Ostracized by their original benefactors, for these acts, al-Wahhab and his followers eventually 
found sanctuary in the sheikhdom of Ibn Saud’s great-great-great grandfather. The Saud family 




exchange for al-Wahhab’s support, the Saud’s recognized him as the final authority in all 
religious matters26 
The Saudi family developed a long history of working with Wahhabi clergy. Mohammad Ibn 
Saud, who initially welcomed in al-Wahhab set about with his followers to spread the Whabbi 
faith to all of those around them. “Together by preaching and the sword they would bring the 
Arabs back to the true faith of Islam.” And for a very long time they were successful. They 
conquered entire swathes of territory and united much of the Middle East. However, they did not 
pay tribute to the Ottomans and the Empire quickly became concerned with this new upstart 
force. They ordered the Egyptians to push back the Saud family and less their power. The 
Egyptians were brutally successful in their mission. Initially welcomed by many of the 
conquered peoples who were happy to be free of the yoke of Wahhabism they then destroyed 
many villages, farms, and civilians earning them the ire of Arabia’s people. Though temporarily 
pushed back, the Saud family would soon find that much of the areas surrounding them were 
filled with people angry at the Ottoman Empire with an (albeit forced) Wahhabi background. 27 
This early alliance laid the groundwork for Ibn Saud’s own upbringing. He learned to recite 
the Quran before he was seven and more importantly for the purposes of this essay Wahhabism 
gave Ibn Saud a facet of unifying strength that allowed him to bind together various tribes of 
Bedouin and create his own fighting force. It also helped to religiously charge Ibn Saud’s 
eventual reconquering of the Emirate of Najd and then expansion into the rest of Arabia. During 
his conquests, Ibn Saud was not simply attempting to reclaim the kingdom of his forefathers, he 
was bringing Arabs together and show them the correct path of Islam: Wahhabism.28 
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The Bedouin were generally not a religious group of people. Their pattern of constant 
movement with their herds and general solitude made it difficult for any sort of orthodox 
religious training to emerge. 29 Most would generally identify as Muslim but they may smoke, 
drink, or do any other number of “sinful” acts that the devout would disapprove of. Paradoxically 
however, this same group of people is uplifted in the Arab cultures. Their lifestyle is generally 
regarded as more pure and are often seen as models of traditional familial values and 
masculinity. But the Bedouin also had a reverence for tradition that fit nicely with Wahhabism’s 
call to return to the time of the prophet. Ibn Wahhab’s preaching often revered the Bedouin as 
most of Arab culture did, and the often violent forms of proselytization fit well within the 
Bedouin’s lifestyle of raiding. 
Using these elements alongside Wahhabism, Ibn Saud was able to convince the Bedouin 
tribes to come together and trade their pastoral lives for a more agrarian lifestyle.30 Once he had 
convinced his tribes to settle, unifying together under the common flag of Islam, Ibn Saud 
suddenly had at his disposal a large number of warriors that no longer had to raid for survival. 
They were fully at his disposal and convinced of his holy mission. With their help Ibn Saud was 
first able to fight against the Rashids and reclaim his family’s capital of Riyadh. Eventually they 
formed a group named after those who traveled with the prophet himself: The Ikhwan.31 
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Chapter 2. The Ikhwan and Ibn Saud’s Saudi Arabia 
I.  The Founding of the Ikhwan 
“All men who joined al-wahhabiya were called Ikhwan, or brethren, and were promised equal 
treatment regardless of their tribal origins or race, something new in Arabia. This latter-day Hijra 
or migration was akin to the Prophet’s move from Mecca to Medina…and signified a renunciation 
of tribal bonds in favor of loyalty to the larger brotherhood of Islam.”32 
 Ibn Saud was not the first to try and spread Wahhabism in Najd. On the contrary, his 
family had, at different times in their history, spread Wahhabism to their people and then used 
the faith in order to motivate their subjects to expand their kingdom. While the Saud family’s use 
of Wahhabism as a recruiting force had generally waned by the Ibn Saud’s lifetime, his religious 
practices and preference for Spartan lifestyles made him well suited for another revival of 
Wahhabism in the region.  
 Under the leadership of Ibn Saud, a new movement for the revival of Wahhabi Islam started 
within the Riyadh countryside.33 Heeding the dire warnings of hellfire for any who persist in 
unbelief preached by al-Wahhab, a group of Bedouin turned away from their pastoral past and 
settled into a sedentary lifestyle. Their community was defined by their strict observance of the 
Quran and subscription to the Hanbali interpretation of Islamic law. This community of believers 
formed the foundations of the movement known as the Ikhwan.34 All aspects of Sharia or Islamic 
law were strictly observed. All were expected to attend the mosque five times a day for prayers. 
Those who were absent without a valid reason could be beaten or even executed for repeated 
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infractions.  At the same time, these early Ikhwan still kept many of the traditions of the 
Bedouin. They still saw combat as a normal part of life, especially for men and so they looked to 
Ibn Saud to give an object to their need for combat. 
 Ibn Saud’s religious background and personal inclination towards Spartan living 
immediately appealed to the Ikhwan. Ibn Saud saw the advantage of these zealots and militarized 
them. Ibn Saud claimed that he started a movement which hoped to preach the proper form of 
Islam to all of the world’s Arabs and set himself at the head. Suddenly Ibn Saud had a powerful 
army that could do much more than conquer his family’s old cities: he could build an empire.  
Moreover, these warriors were elite by the standards of the Arabian Peninsula at the time. 
The Ikhwan were hardened desert travelers and able to move great distances on nothing more 
than a few dates and camel’s milk, and when they fought, they did so with legendary ferocity. As 
Darlow puts it “The Ikhwan, fired by religious zeal, their courage fortified by faith, accustomed 
to rigid discipline and marching under the banner of the one true faith had the potential to 
become a formidable and unique desert fighting force. “35 Convinced that those who died in 
battle were granted immediate entry to heaven as martyrs the Ikhwan were utterly fearless in 
battle and helped Ibn Saud to conquer much more than the Rashids, with them he was able to 
build the empire of Saudi Arabia that we know today. 36 
 Even though the Ikhwan often outnumbered and outgunned Ibn Saud’s regular armed 
forces, they were seen as a supplement to his military as opposed to the sole source of his 
military might. Comprised almost entirely of Bedouin tribes that joined and settled in the name 
of Islam, the Ikhwan also granted Ibn Saud a religious legitimacy that he would otherwise have 
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not had. Using them, he was able to send their religious leaders to towns ahead of his army with 
the goal of creating Wahhabi sentiments in the population. With this foundation laid, the people 
with their new found religious sentiments would often decry the heresies of their old leaders and 
welcome Ibn Saud and his religious warriors.  Eventually, though this religious zealotry would 
turn against Ibn Saud and force him to fight against the very soldiers he worked so hard to 
create.37 
II. The Conquest of Riyadh 
The Saud’s family’s fortunes started to turn in the early 1900s. The Ottomans had decided to 
lift up the Saud family as a means of countering the rising power of the Rashids. This extra 
favor, as mentioned in the previous chapter, allowed the Sheikh of Kuwait to offer shelter to the 
Saudi family. Here the Saud family stayed for years, as Mubarak took an interest in young Ibn 
Saud and taught him the art of statecraft. He allowed Ibn Saud to stay with him as he governed 
his kingdom and entertained guests, and conducted diplomacy.38 However, it was during this 
time with Mubarak that Ibn Saud learned valuable information about the Rashids. Ibn Saud 
found that the Rashid who had removed his family from their ancestral home had passed leaving 
the city in the hands of a much younger cousin.  
The Saud quickly became invigorated with a new fervor to recapture Riyadh, the most 
enthusiastic being Ibn Saud who at seventeen years old was eager to prove himself as a capable 
leader and warrior. Still, though, the Saud family was relatively penniless and needed Mubarak’s 
support. Mubarak was generally interested in aiding the Saud family as a weaker Rashidi tribe 
was also in the security interests of Kuwait, however he was unwilling to publically move 
                                                 
37 Niblock, Tim. Saudi Arabia: power, legitimacy and survival. London: Routledge, 2006. 37, 55 
38 House, Karen Elliott. On Saudi Arabia: its people, past, religion, fault lines and future. New York: Alfred A. 




against the Ottomans or the Rashids without external support. Doing so would have risked 
Mubarak’s entire kingdom. So the Saud’s waited, until finally the British, seeing the imperialistic 
expansion of the Germans in the late 1890’s and sensing weakness in the Ottoman Empire made 
an alliance with Kuwait. 39 
The Ottomans tried to counter this move but were ultimately unable to prevent this 
British/Kuwaiti agreement. With the British guaranteeing Kuwaiti security, Mubarak, with his 
position now more secure, felt comfortable helping the Saud family raise arms against the 
Rashids. 40 
The fighting against the Rashids was difficult and long. For over two years, Mubarak and the 
Sauds attacked the Rashids and were pushed back. The hot summers of Arabia made 
conventional campaigns difficult and allowed some respite for the Saudi family to replenish their 
forces but it was clear that conventional arms were not going to be an effective means of 
reclaiming Riyadh. So, after two years of fighting, Ibn Saud gathered Mubarak and fifty other 
fighting men. He took unconventional routes gathering sympathetic tribesmen along the way.   
With the same characteristic luck and bravery that had served him so well in Bedouin 
Ghazous, Ibn Saud began to reclaim his kingdom The small group of fighters was fierce enough 
to cause great harm to the tribes that supported Ibn Saud’s enemies, but small enough to 
seemingly disappear into the desert when pursued by a stronger force. Traveling by night, Ibn 
Saud slowly directed his forces to Riyadh. Using the Eid celebration to cover their advance Ibn 
Saud quickly reached the city ready to attack. 41 
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Instead of directly attacking or besieging the city, Ibn Saud decided to go with a more 
traditionally Bedouin approach to the attack. He selected his 6 best men from his force to sneak 
in and remove the Rashidi governor. Through his spies, Ibn Saud knew the governor would be 
vulnerable when he went to visit his wife’s house as he did most mornings. His men were let into 
the city by a family with loyalist sentiments and his men were able to then subdue the governor’s 
wife. After waiting for some time, the governor arrived relatively unguarded and unarmed. Even 
with his smaller entourage the governors guards still outnumbered Ibn Saud’s men. With the 
element of surprise however Ibn Saud was able to defeat the Rashidi governor. He then opened 
the gates to his remaining forces and allowed the Rashidi garrison safe passage out of the city. 
Ibn Saud sent out runners throughout Riyadh of what had happened. Before the end of the day 
Ibn Saud was leading the city in their evening prayers declaring before the entire town and God 
that he was in control of Riyadh. 42 
Despite his success in Riyadh, Ibn Saud still had a long way to go in terms of proving 
himself to the Bedouin. By virtue of his conquest, and in particular the method of his victory in 
Riyadh, he had proven to possess some of the three vital traits of Bedouin leadership but 
ultimately his victory was an insignificant one. True, he had captured a city but it was relatively 
small. He would have to prove that he could hold his new territory, defend it against invaders, 
and govern it fairly. 
Ibn Saud was aware of those expectations and after securing Riyadh he immediately set the 
towns people to work repairing any damage on the town’s walls and preparing for a potential 
counter attack. He also publically declared himself a leader as he lead the town in their afternoon 
prayers. However, all were not convinced of Ibn Saud’s right to rule. Mutliba, the wife of the 
                                                 




now dead Rashidi governor of Riyadh in the days following his death presented Ibn Saud with a 
pillow she had made herself. Such a gift implied submission and an acceptance of Ibn Saud’s 
right to rule. She had secretly placed a number of spells upon the pillow though intended to kill 
Ibn Saud. Supposedly, Ibn Saud became extremely ill shortly after receiving the pillow and was 
only cured by the work of a famous spell breaker. Ibn Saud claimed that “In the process of the 
spell being broken, a large quantity of small black worms or caterpillars came out of [his] nose 
and many small white worms were discharged from his throat.”43  
While such a story is very likely the result of a great deal of exaggeration, it is important to 
understand that most of the historical records of this time came from Ibn Saud himself. The truth 
of such a story is largely irrelevant as it demonstrates Ibn Saud’s own personal belief that such 
evil magic existed and that he would have succumbed to it had God not intervened. This is likely 
indicative of a larger view on Ibn Saud’s part. By sharing this story, he shows that he clearly 
believed in the actualized power of God and in this case, Satan. By maintaining this narrative of 
literal combat between good and evil likely helped Ibn Saud to find recruits to his cause both as 
Ikhwan and Wahhabis. Moreover, stories like this one help to create a mythology around Ibn 
Saud. Much of Ibn Saud’s self-told history reads more as a heroic saga than an actual history. 
That isn’t to say that Ibn Saud wasn’t an exception man (he was) but instead it suggests that Ibn 
Saud was invested in creating an image of himself that was larger than life. Stories like this one 
create an image of Ibn Saud that helped to position him as the leader of Wahhabi Muslims even 
beyond the borders of his Kingdom, an image he used to spread his faith and his political power. 
III. The Reconquest of Saudi Arabia And William Shakspear 
                                                 




Largely due to his governorship in Riyadh, Ibn Saud was able to establish a base of support 
while his enemies, the Rashids prepared for a counterattack. The Rashids prepared their forces to 
re-take Riyadh while Ibn Saud used his position in Riyadh to recruit even more warriors. Ibn 
Saud was able to use his knowledge as a Bedouin leader to recruit a great deal of fighters and 
when the Rashids finally came the first barrage of Ibn Saud’s rifles decided the battle. 44 
Ibn Saud’s followers continued to pursue the Rashidi army using guerilla warfare, tactics 
quite familiar to the desert warriors.45  The Ikhwan in particular excelled in this type of warfare 
winning many victories over the Rashids and the Ottomans, until they final won major victory in 
Rawdat Muhanna that killed the Rashid leader, Abdul-Aziz. This triumph, opened up massive 
swathes of land to Ibn Saud and a quick letter pledging allegiance to the Ottoman Empire 
convinced the Ottoman’s that Ibn Saud was easier to tolerate than the was to remove. The 
Empire accepted his claim to the new territory giving Ibn Saud permanent legitimacy over the 
entire regions of Najd and Qassim in what is now central Saudi Arabia.46 
While Ibn Saud was an experienced desert warrior, even the most hardy of Bedouin do not 
campaign during the Arabian summer. Ibn Saud would take his warriors to Kuwait during the 
summer months of his campaigns. Due to its position as a major port, Kuwait had earned the 
interest of many of the major global powers at the time. Kuwait was a major port in the Arabian 
sea and as European powers like Britain and Germany sought to expand their global influence 
they sent diplomats to Kuwait city into Mubarak’s palace where they met Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud 
knew the strength of European power in the Arab world. He used his summers to spend time 
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bragging about his military victories, exaggerating his own up and coming power trying to form 
alliances with those who wished to weaken Ottoman rule. 
 Ibn Saud’s victories alongside his connections in Kuwait helped foreign powers to notice Ibn 
Saud, and take an interest in him. As part of their campaign to weaken the Ottoman Empire as 
World War I was starting, the British sent envoys into the desert to forge alliances for England 
and undermine its enemies. Through these envoys in 1910 Ibn Saud met the westerner who, 
more than any other, would change his life: William Henry Irvine Shakespear.47  
An army officer with a reputation for being a man of action, Shakespear did not fit the typical 
mold of a diplomat. While he was particularly good at gaining the trust of local rulers, his lack of 
awareness of his own subordinate rank, and total disregard for established traditions of higher 
society made Shakespear more enemies than friends. Wanting to keep his talents, but also take 
him out of harm’s way, the British decided to send Shakespear to the Middle East, a position 
which suited Shakespear quite well.48 
Shakespear immediately took to learning Arab and Bedouin culture. He became fluent in 
Arabic and felt most at home among the Bedouin. It was a happy coincidence that he seemed 
almost hand made to befriend Ibn Saud. First arriving in Mubarak’s kingdom in Kuwait, 
Shakespear heard stories of Ibn Saud and sought him out.  When he finally met Ibn Saud the pair 
became extremely close friends.49They would sit and speak, often for days about politics, their 
differing countries and their places in the world, and most often how to outwit the Ottoman 
Empire.  
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As their friendship grew they discussed Ibn Saud’s plans for his kingdom. It was clear that 
Ibn Saud sought British protection against the Ottomans and the Rashids. Shakespear counseled 
Ibn Saud about his enemies, particularly the Ottomans and the Rashids and learned about the 
growing Wahhabi movement that Ibn Saud claimed allegiance to. While religiously rigid, 
Shakespear was pleased to see that such rigidness did not translate to a lack of interest in the 
world or in the West. Quite the contrary, he found Ibn Saud to be an extremely worldly man of 
great political wit and tact.50 
Though Ibn Saud may have been unaware of it, Shakespear had quickly become Saud’s 
greatest advocate in the British government. “His praise of Ibn Saud’s character and attributes as 
an Arab leader was even more glowing than he had given in his report of their first meeting a 
year earlier. He repeated and endorsed Ibn Saud’s version of events…”51 Shakespear urged his 
superiors to consider Ibn Saud’s proposal for British protection and even requested that he serve 
as a permanent liaison between the two countries. While Shakspear’s close personal relationship 
with Ibn Saud undoubtedly played a role in this recommendation, Shakespear was utterly loyal to 
the British Empire. Shakespear rightly believed that Ibn Saud had a very large role to play in the 
Arabian Peninsula and with the help of British protection, would become a stalwart friend of the 
Empire.  The British, decided they could guarantee Ibn Saud’s loyalty with a stipend rather than 
a guarantee of protection, especially as such a guarantee would greatly upset relations with the 
Ottoman Empire.52 
Ten times Ibn Saud appealed to the British for protection, and ten times he was rejected. 
Understanding that he could not rely on foreign support, he turned to his own people and 
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resources. And most importantly, he turned to their unifying faith. He began to rely on the 
Ikhwan more intensely and used the chaos that came with the First World War in order to expand 
his own powers against the dwindling Ottoman Empire’s. Each new city that fell to his desert 
warriors was forced to embrace Wahhabism. For many citizens it was an easy choice, but these 
early victories also ingrained another Saudi tradition that would have massive long term 
ramifications: Shi’a repression.53 Sometimes directly targeted by the Ikhwan, other times simply 
the victims of systematic persecution the Shi’a faced constant struggles under the expanding  
Kingdom of Ibn Saud.54 
IV. The End of the Ikhwan 
 As Ibn Saud’s kingdom grew so too did his international prominence. Kingdoms like 
Great Britain which had once all but ignored Ibn Saud’s requests for alliances and protections 
were forced to acknowledge that the Saudi family was here to stay. This led to internal conflicts 
within the kingdom itself. The British Empire, by definition was an apostate in the eyes of the 
Ikhwan and their religious leader simply speaking to them was a serious offense.55  
Not only that, but the Ikhwan felt constrained by Ibn Saud’s treaties. Against the wishes 
of the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud recognized the borders of colonial possessions like Transjordan. These 
lands were inhabited by Muslims that, in the Ikhwan’s eyes, needed to be taught the ways of the 
proper path of Islam. Bored by the stalled pace of Ibn Saud’s expansions, and fueled by a 
religious desire to spread the word of Islam, the Ikhwan began raiding into Transjordan.56 They 
raided colonial possessions, they raided border posts and they even raided other Saudi citizens. 
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And even worse, these raids were nothing like the tradition Ghazou. The Ikhwan had left those 
traditions long ago and now they found with the express purpose of killing. They quickly gained 
a reputation for killing their male prisoners and even occasionally killing women and children as 
well. 57 
Eventually Ibn Saud lost control over the Ikhwan almost entirely. While they still 
conquered in his name and aimed to spread Islam, he could no longer direct or restrain them. 
This became apparent in Taif a city near Mecca that the Ikhwan captured. While the Ikhwan 
claim that they were fired on by a police station first, their reaction was undisputedly bloody. 
The Ikwhan went door to door massacring the inhabitants of the conquered city killing 
thousands.58 It was clear at this point that Ibn Saud was no longer in control of this heavily 
armed, heavily motivated fighting force that now rampaged across his lands and threatened to 
undo all he had worked to achieve. The Ikhwan had to be dealt with quickly and violently.  
Ibn Saud at first turned to the British to help him reign in the Ikhwan. Also feeling the 
effects of the Ikhwan’s raiding parties the British thought to use their air force to stop the 
Ikhwan. However, despite a few successes from the British, the Ikhwan knew the deserts of 
Arabia far better than any of the British pilots and the lack of proper tracking technology made it 
almost impossible for the British warplanes to provide any protection to those traveling in the 
desert.59 The ineffective response of the British and Ibn Saud to the Ikhwan led to rumors that 
Ibn Saud had grown fat and lethargic in Riyadh. The Ikhwan rose up in rebellion to establish a 
new, stronger leader: Duwish.60 
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Ibn Saud met the rebel forces with all of the technology that his new allies the British had 
supplied him. Vehicles mounted with machine guns and air support made quick work of the 
Ikhwan forces at the battle of Sabilla. Though accounts on the battle vary from a pitched battle to 
an absolute massacre of the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud clearly emerged the victor.61  
After the battle, Duwish sent emissaries offering his surrender to Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud had 
clearly had enough of the violence against his own people, but also felt that there had to be some 
sort of punitive action. He decided that the Ikhwan would surrender their weapons and horses as 
well as any loot they had taken from Ibn Saud’s territory and that Duwish himself must come 
before Ibn Saud and surrender.  
Despite what was assuredly his going to be his execution, Duwish accepted and was 
brought before Ibn Saud on a stretcher as he was injured during the battle. Ibn Saud, saw the injured 
man and said “You are no match for me, I am too powerful for you. I pardon you. You may go 
wherever you wish and I will give you whatever you need. But your future actions and behavior, 
good or bad, will be judged by me…”62 He then had Duwish’s wounds dressed and sent him home.  
Later Ibn Saud told his people “he did not like killing even one Muslim but that obedience to God 
was necessary and that [The Ikhwan] had become fanatics who had acted against the instructions 
of Sharia.”63 By using this characteristic mix of punitive action and rehabilitation Ibn Saud was 
able to then incorporate the much more easily controlled elements of the Ikhwan into the Saudi 
National Guard.64  
Despite this victory over the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud was either unable or unwilling to fully 
eliminate the religious zeal that the Ikhwan embodied. Ibn Saud likely found such fervor to be 
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favorable. He likely found it to be especially He likely found it to be especially favorable because, 
despite this most recent uprising, Ibn Saud was a true Wahhabi and it made sense to have his 
population follow his own religious inclinations. Unfortunately for the nation’s stability however, 
the royal family, due to a massive influx of new wealth generally failed to pick up on the same 
Spartan habits of their patriarch.  
V. The Creation Of the Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia 
With the Ikhwan defeated, Ibn Saud turned to his own kingdom. He now had total control 
over his family’s historical kingdom of Nejd as well as that of his enemies in Hejaz. On 
September 23, in 1932, seizing on his gain in political capital from his victory over the Ikhwan, 
Ibn Saud unified the Kingdoms of Hejaz and Najd into one not so humbly declaring them the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.65 
The strong foreign powers at his borders meant that conquest was unlikely to continue to 
be a major focus for the kingdom so Ibn Saud turned to his skills at statecraft. His kingdom, 
while wide was generally barren. Yes, he controlled many cities but he also controlled vast 
swathes of territory with nothing but desert and very few natural resources.  
To make matters worse, Ibn Saud had learned leadership from the Bedouin. Leaders in 
Bedouin tribes are not only chosen for their wisdom or combat prowess, but also for their wealth. 
Among the Bedouin, a leader was expected to provide for their people in times of scarcity but no 
Bedouin had ever had to take care of an entire city before, much less a kingdom. To his merit, 
Ibn Saud maintained his Bedouin traditions as a king. He would regularly give lavish gifts to any 
who would visit him and hosted a daily meal where any of his subjects could come to his palace 
                                                 




and receive food. To be sure, the cost added up and eventually gifts and other similar expenses 
made up a major portion of the Saudi economic budget.66 
Thankfully, Ibn Saud had one major source of income: The Hajj. The Hajj, a Muslim 
pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca occurs once a year in the Islamic Calendar. All Muslims 
who are physically and financially able are expected to make the trip at least once in their 
lifetime regardless of their home country and going more than once is considered to be especially 
praiseworthy. Ibn Saud’s kingdom was able to use this large, regular influx of visitors as a major 
revenue generator through taxes and other tariffs.67 
This system of taxation worked for some time, but eventually Ibn Saud’s open handedness 
with his children and grandchildren alongside the prolific nature of his relationship with his 
wives meant that the expenses of the kingdom grew exponentially. Furthermore, in the early 
1930s the entire world was struck by the great depression and Muslims the world over suddenly 
stopped coming on the Hajj. Saudi’s foreign allies like the British were still reeling from World 
War One and the depression themselves and significantly dropped their foreign payments. The 
Saudi family needed a second source of income, fast. 
VI. The Discovery of Oil 
 Fortunately for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia however, Ibn Saud had made the 
acquaintance of a man by the name of Charles Crane. Crane was an American philanthropist who 
had helped Yemen explore its mineral resources. In 1931 Crane approached Ibn Saud about 
doing the same for his country, especially the vast swathes of territory he had conquered after his 
victories over the Rashids and the Ikhwan. Ibn Saud desperate for a new source of income and 
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water resources as his population grew, agreed. Crane sent Karl Twitchell a geologist to conduct 
water and mineral survey. Twitchell knew that a part of Ibn Saud’s kingdom called Hasa had a 
similar geological limestone shelf to Iran and Bahrain. In both of those countries, drilling into the 
shelf uncovered vast oil deposits.68 Moreover, the Hasa region in particular was filled with old 
Ottoman reports of oil seepages, though no one remembered exactly where. Despite Twitchell’s 
best efforts none could be found. Ibn Saud needed a bail out and oil seemed liked a likely path. 
But without a guarantee of oil inside his country, no company was willing to give Ibn Saud the 
vast amounts of money he requested for drilling rights. That is, until they finally struck oil.69  
After years of trying, Ibn Saud had almost entirely given up on the hope of finding oil in 
Saudi Arabia. Occasionally major oil companies would send their geologists with the hope of 
finally finding Saudi Arabia’s hidden oil wealth. While Ibn Saud generally entertained them and 
allowed them to search he always made sure to include that they also do something for the 
Kingdom, specifically drill water wells for Saudi’s people. 
Finally, in April of 1937 two geologists from the United States, Max Seineke and Floyd 
Meeker found a cut into the limestone shelf that they had all assumed held oil. Realizing how 
deep the limestone went, but still believing there was oil inside the geologists were convinced 
that the previous expeditions before him were simply not drilling deep enough. They convinced 
their drilling crews to drill to an unprecedentedly deep level over 4,700 feet below the surface. 
Right before giving up the well struck one of the largest sources of oil in the world. Suddenly Ibn 
Saud could fix his monetary difficulties. He held a bid over drilling rights, and while the British 
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companies generally kept their offers around the same, pre-oil discovery rates, the Americans 
matched Ibn Saud’s offer. He found a buyer, and an ally in the United States.70 
Generally put off by the British lack of cultural understanding and attention to Saudi Arabia, 
Ibn Saud welcomed the Americans into his country. This arrangement proved to be particularly 
valuable to the Americans too as they entered World War Two with a new source of oil. The 
United States, seeing the value of access to such a resource was often willing to renegotiate the 
original agreement to allow more favorable terms for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.71 It was this 
re-negotiation that made Saudi Arabia into the incredibly wealthy country that we know of it 
today. But while this wealth did not turn Ibn Saud from his habits of austere Wahhabi living, his 
many children did not benefit from the same Bedouin upbringing. Their habits of excess and 
indulgence ran completely counter to the country’s Wahhabi traditions and this dissonance led to 
the resurgence of one of the greatest internal threats Saudi Arabia faces today religious 
extremism. 
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Chapter 3. The Siege of The Grand Mosque of Mecca 
I. Ibn Saud’s Twilight 
Ibn Saud’s shrewd negotiations had solved the Kingdom’s financial problems for the 
foreseeable future and with little doubt had helped the allies and more specifically the United 
States win the Second World War. In less than sixty years Ibn Saud started in exile and built a 
political power house and allied to the victors of the Great War and an integral friend to what 
became the most powerful nation on Earth, the United States.  
But the task of governing was quite different now. Ibn Saud’s style of governance thrived in 
the margins, he relied on greater powers underestimating his tiny kingdom and being able to turn 
neutrality into alliance once a clear winner was chosen. Even during World War II, Ibn Saud had 
entertained guests from the Third Reich.72 
Moreover Ibn Saud’s country was changing, and quickly. Saudi Arabia a country built on 
daily struggle, austerity, and tribal ties had quickly become one of the wealthiest nations on 
Earth. Clearly changes were on the horizon and not just material changes, Saudi society on the 
whole would undergo massive changes with this new wealth.  And the next generation would 
have to reconcile their culture built on scarcity while surrounded in plenty.  
Ibn Saud was getting older. He had entered into his sixties and his life of war and desert life 
had taken its toll on his body. He still kept up the traditions of an Arab leader, frequently 
entertaining guests and oil workers with lavish feasters but as one of his guests noted “He 
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seemed tired, as if life was becoming a burden to him. ‘He seemed to have lost his sparkle…the 
glory of manhood of the Sultan was passing”73 
Saudi Arabia’s new global position meant Ibn Saud was also expected to play a larger part in 
global Arab politics. His relationship with Egypt waxed and waned but generally improved under 
king Farouk. And, in fact, Ibn Saud was quite popular in Egypt. During royal visits, the people of 
Egypt greeted Ibn Saud with cheers and smiles while young parents held their children up to get 
a good view of a truly Muslim Monarch.  
King Farouk had lost much of his country’s support due to what his people saw as 
subservience to the West and in the late 1920’s a group of Muslims began to organize seeking 
out reform in Egypt based on the Quran and Shariah. These reformers wanted to model Egypt 
after Saudi Arabia and they called themselves The Muslim Brotherhood. 74 
At the same time, the horrors of the Holocaust had created a new international fervor for 
Zionism. Leaders the world over saw the persecution that Jewish peoples faced, and their own 
populations, fresh from liberating the persecuted from concentration camps in Germany and 
Poland pushed their leaders for actions. There was a great cry for a Jewish homeland and 
Palestine was to be that homeland.  
The issues surrounding Palestine, its choice as the homeland for the Jewish people, and the 
circumstances through which immigration and relocation occurred go well beyond the scope of 
this thesis. To explore the issue in sufficient depth would require its own thesis and while I am 
sure such a report is worthy of being written (and I am equally sure multiples of such papers 
already exist) that is not my intent for this piece.  
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Suffice it to say that the creation of Israel brought about feelings of Pan Arabism and anti-
Westernism throughout much of the Middle East. Ibn Saud’s new position as a major 
international leader and king of presumably the wealthiest Arab nation at the time meant that 
there were great expectations on him from both his own people and others to push about against 
the West and help build Arab autonomy. Such hard stances generally went against Ibn Saud’s 
style of playing both sides of the fence when it came to international politics and he was, much 
to the disappointment of many Arabs across the world, generally careful to not offend his 
American or British allies when it came to the Palestine issue.  
Piling onto these problems was Ibn Saud’s spending habits. Despite the massive amounts of 
income coming into the country, Ibn Saud and more specifically the demands of his massive 
family had left the kingdom spending more than it took in. Aware of these issues, he had 
financial advisors brought in from foreign nations all of whom advised the same thing, Ibn Saud 
would have to separate his family’s wealth from the state’s income. Ibn Saud outright refused. 
He could not fathom a world wherein he did not have total control over what he felt was his 
money. 75 
Even still he had refused to implement many social programs that would have helped bridge 
the gap between the two groups of extremely wealthy and extremely impoverished people in his 
newly rich country. Ibn Saud was quick to point out that his young nation lacked the 
infrastructure that would have allowed those welfare programs to succeed. He could easily build 
hospitals and universities all over his country, but without people to run them they would simply 
be empty buildings testifying to a failed state program.  
                                                 




Eventually, Ibn Saud’s health finally got the better of him and he began giving up some of 
his power to his heirs. Ibn Saud’s massive family and large number of wives caused a bit of an 
issue when it came to determining succession. He had over 37 sons and an unknown number of 
daughters and by the 1950’s the royal princes had separated into multiple groups each bandying 
for power with Ibn Saud’s inevitable demise on the horizon.  
Seeing the different factions emerge and fearing a civil war after his death, Ibn Saud began 
abdicating power to his official heir, Prince Saud. However, Ibn Saud’s abdication of power had 
coincided with the first major oil strike in the Kingdom.76 
Previously, Saudi Arabia had kept its own workers in oilfields separate from their western 
colleagues. The Arab workers had massive disparities in pay and in living conditions, especially 
when compared with the sometimes literal white picket fence style homes that their American 
colleagues lived in. Even still, these workers had not seen an increase in their wages despite the 
massive amounts of wealth they were generating and the ever rising prices of a developing 
nation. Eventually workers inside a major Aramco camp decided enough was enough and 
refused to work. 77 
The strike lasted for months, through fairly harsh treatment from the camp’s security forces. 
The Americans on the camp wrote letters to their colleagues back in the states claiming that 
Arabs were simply easily riled and commented on how the site inconvenienced their access to 
the Aramco camp’s stables. While some may point to the west as the source of these striker’s 
inspiration, it probably more likely came from their home countries of Egypt, and Syria where 
socialist and pan-Arab movements were picking up greater and greater steam.  
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This would be the last great crisis that Ibn Saud would face. Shortly after the strike ended Ibn 
Saud died in his sleep on November 9th 1953. A true Wahhabi Muslim, his funeral was suitably 
austere. “[In Riyadh], in accordance with strict Wahhabi custom, he was buried in an unmarked 
grave and his clothes were sold in the market place… His last words were ‘There is no power 
and no strength save in God.’78 
II. Succession in the Kingdom 
To many, Ibn Saud’s greatest success was his ability to united Hejaz and Nejd and build the 
country that we know as modern Saudi Arabia all within a single lifetime. As the world has seen 
time and again with many great rulers from Alexander to Genghis Khan, the greater challenge 
comes after their death. Foreign countries had speculated on an eventual civil war between Ibn 
Saud’s heirs for years.79 Moreover, the circumstances of Ibn Saud’s death almost begged for 
conflict.  
At the time of his death, Ibn Saud’s official heir, Prince Saud, was away on business and his 
second eldest son, Prince Faisal, was with Ibn Saud, at his death. Thankfully, Ibn Saud foresaw 
the potential rivalry between his sons and met with them before his death. He made Faisal swear 
loyalty to Prince Saud and ensured that Prince Saud named Prince Faisal his heir after his death. 
These pledges miraculously held up after Ibn Saud’s passing and ensured the Kingdom did not 
fall into civil war, but Saudi Arabia was far from out of the woods. 
Ibn Saud had failed to address many of the growing problems in his kingdom. The disparity 
between the rich and poor grew at an exponential rate, food insecurity was rampant throughout 
the country and healthcare was generally inadequate. Prince Saud removed many of Ibn Saud’s 
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administrators who, while effective at administrating a smaller kingdom, were entirely 
unprepared to manage the issues Saudi Arabia currently faced. He also pledged to address 
poverty, and healthcare, all while increasing Saudi Arabia’s military strength and preserving the 
religious principles of its founding. 80 
III.  Post Ibn Saud Saudi Arabia 
But Prince Saud at the start of his reign lacked the popular support that allowed Ibn Saud to 
keep many of these issues in check and the problems from Ibn Saud’s leadership started to grow. 
The Bedouin tribes that Ibn Saud connected with on such a personal level began to look at the 
lavish palaces of Riyadh and other cities with disdain. The people of Saudi Arabia became even 
more aware of the growing poverty gap as the royal family’s estates grew and new buildings 
popped up forcing relocations of the shanty towns that had developed throughout Riyadh.81 
Compounding to this, the growing size of the royal family meant that inevitably some would 
break from the Wahhabi traditions of their upbringing. And each new report of drunkenness, 
extravagance, or even dealings with the West were likely to be broadcast on the radios that had 
just recently become a household good.  
On top of this, Pan-Arabism, Marxism, socialism had reached a peak of strength in Egypt and 
Syria. These movements spoke to many Saudi Arabians on a personal level, Marxism in 
particular reached many of the more impoverished groups like those working in the oil fields. 
Suddenly new opposition groups started to build against the Saudi Royal family. A group of 
school children demanded the end of controlled curriculum and the dissolution of the Saudi 
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morality police. The leaders of this group were captured and publically whipped for “being 
infected with communism.”82 The kingdom also tried to fight against the ideals of secularism by 
offering cash prizes for children who memorized the Quran. 
Over time, other groups also formed although with generally disparate ideas. Some of these 
groups professed ideals of pan-Arabism, anti-Westernism while still others sought out liberal 
reforms within their governments. These different groups wanted everything from the removal of 
the west from Saudi Arabia, specifically its oil companies while others asked for a free press, 
help for the impoverished and better education especially for women.  Fortunately for Prince 
Saud, none of these groups were able to unify on such a large scale to unite those Saudi Arabians 
who felt disenfranchised. For the most part, they stayed generally disparate with differing 
demands on the royal family keeping them from ever representing an actual threat to the royal 
family.83 
While none of these movements ever fully achieved their goals, there were some marginal 
successes. A protest in Dhahran confronted King Saud and handed him a list of their demands 
which included higher wages, shorter hours and some measures of job protections. The King 
initially refused their demands and asked that the leaders of the movement be arrested. This led 
to an even greater protest which, while it was eventually put down, it also led King Saud to 
implement some reforms. After Dhahran, he started to look into better education programs and 
updated hospitals and even opened up some schools for women.84 
Eventually, power passed from King Saud to Prince Faisal who immediately set to work 
trying to remove Saudi Arabia from its deep hole of debt and public scrutiny. King Faisal was 
                                                 






generally successful in his efforts. When he started his reign, Saudi Arabia was hemorrhaging 
money to corruption and the Saudi Riyal was incredibly unstable. Over the course of six years, 
Faisal was able to cut spending by two thirds and helped to stabilize the Riyal. He worked 
diligently to resist corruption and to build Saudi Arabia’s internal economy.  
While his reforms seem to have been successful, they carried a great a political cost. Many of 
his reforms, particularly those focusing on education chaffed against the Wahhabi base of Saudi 
Arabia. And many traditional tribesmen and religious leaders condemned the reforms.  In order 
to help build Saudi Arabia, King Faisal also took to importing workers from foreign countries. 
Saudi Arabia was somewhat unique in their importation of foreign workers, though. Not only did 
King Faisal bring in educated workers that Saudi infrastructure could not provide yet, but they 
also brought in many of laborers for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs that many Saudi Arabians 
could not or simply refused to do.  
As with all rapid changes tensions emerged, compounded by the fact that Saudi Arabia had 
remained guarded from outside influence for the vast majority of its history. Many in the 
Kingdom, particularly its religious elites pushed back against King Faisal’s call to modernize. 
They felt that King Faisal was intentionally moving away from the religious foundations of 
Saudi Arabia and they started to express those opinions violently.  
In 1965, after King Faisal had authorized the use of the television in Saudi Arabia he was 
greeted with violent riots instigated by conservative priests who felt that the television violated 
Islam’s moratorium on grave images. These riots were violently put down, but they would rise 
up time and again. While each time, the protestors had a generally different issue they were 




towards modernization had turned the country away from its Islamic roots and these protestors 
were willing to do whatever it took to correct their country’s course, even if it meant violence.  
IV. Juhayman 
It is within this backdrop of religious extremism in the midst of indulgent excess that 
Juhayman, horrified Muslims everywhere as he led an army of his followers to take over the 
Grand Mosque of Mecca one of the holiest places in Islam. Juhayman was born the son of one of 
the Ikhwan survivors of Sibillah. Defeated by Ibn Saud’s western machines and cast aside for the 
same religious fanaticism that had brought them into the King’s good graces the Ikhwan were 
left to fester with their resentment. 85 
Juhayman, meaning ugly face, was named in a typically Bedouin fashion. He was given a 
harsh name to prepare him for his harsh life. From an early age Juhayman was immersed in the 
culture of the Ikhwan. He heard their stories of fighting both for Ibn Saud and later against them. 
He heard his people recount how they believed the Saudi family had fallen from their austere 
roots in Wahhabism and he found a home in the Saudi National guard. The National Guard had 
been Saudi Arabia’s rebranding of the Ikhwan, still religiously focused but now totally loyal to 
the royal family. Inside the National Guard he was generally protected from any legal action 
against his political leanings, but eventually he found himself on the run from the law and cut off 
from his means of support. 86 
Ostracized form others and almost entirely on his own, Juhayman became increasingly 
radicalized. He started by writing “The Letters of Juhayman,” a series of twelve letters that 
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would serve as an explanation and inspiration for Islamic extremists years after him. Juhayman 
claimed that “The Al-Saud....had exploited religion as ‘a means to guarantee their worldly 
interests, putting an end to jihad, paying allegiance to the Christians [America], and bringing evil 
and corruption upon Muslims.”87 It was in essence, the extremist’s position against the Saudi 
Royal family. It was the reason why the Ikwhan fought at the battle of Sabillah and is one of the 
fundamental underpinnings of Osama Bin Laden’s letters to the world after his attacks on 9/11. 88 
He modeled many of his own actions after those of the prophet: he would articulate his inner 
monologue attempting to emulate the prophet. He even went on to show how the Saudi family 
were not blood relatives to Muhammad (a claim the Saudi family has never actually made.) All 
of his actions seemed to have two primary goals to them. First, Juhayman was attempting to 
establish his own legitimacy not only as a font of religious knowledge but as a source of 
religious sanctity and second, he was questioning the Saudi family’s right to rule. Both of these 
claims were, from a religious and political perspective, quite serious.  
His move from religious zeal to zealot occurred one night in the desert during the late 1970s. 
He had been contemplating the Mahdi and its position in Islam, when he received a dream. In 
that dream Juhayman claimed that the Mahdi’s identity was revealed to him as one of his 
followers: Mohammed Abdullah Al-Qahtani. Juhayman identified Al-Qahtani as the Mahdi to 
his followers who then started to report similar dreams of their own. Al-Qahtani’s own sister 
even dreamed she saw her brother standing at the great mosque in a great victory. Convinced that 
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he was on the right path Juhayman began to prepare. He was going to take over the Great 
Mosque of Mecca and then let God himself cleanse the kingdom for his righteous followers. 
Juhayman began to prepare with supplies and weapons while he sent his followers out into 
the desert intent on practicing their marksmanship. Juhayman had found the Mahdi, the Islamic 
year A.H. 1400 was on the horizon and even better they knew of a system of cellars and 
basements beneath the Grand Mosque which would serve as the perfect defensible spot. Oddly 
enough, while the followers were clearly critical of the Saudi family they did not actually have a 
plan for its downfall. It seems as though they believed that by taking the mosque, God would be 
so inspired by the actions of his followers that he would then send his angels or some other force 
to bring about the new world that Juhayman and his followers so deeply desired.89 
In Juhayman’s mind it was clear: he had a plan, he had the forces, the training, and the 
supplies and most importantly he had the Mahdi himself. He just needed to put the Mahdi in the 
right place at the right time and then let God do the rest.  
V. The Siege of the Great Mosque 
To say the Kaaba is a religiously important place would be a massive understatement. Its role 
within Islam goes beyond words. According to Islam, the Kaaba houses one of the first shrines 
made to God by Adam and it the literal centerpiece to a yearly pilgrimage that all Muslims must 
undergo at least once in their lifetime. That said, the Kaaba and the mosque surrounding it are 
still very much open during the rest of the year, and as a citizen of Mecca you are able to bring 
your deceased relatives to the Kaaba as part of their funeral. Disguising their weapons on the 
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stretchers that carry the bodies of the dead into the mosque Juhayman and his followers were 
able to sneak in huge numbers of rifles, ammunition and supplies into the mosque. 90 
At the sound of the first call to prayer, the rebels broke out their weapons and took out their 
microphone proclaiming the new Mahdi. They killed police officers guarding the mosque and 
then barred the doors. Quite suddenly Gods house had been taken over and now the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia would have to deal with it.91 
Needless to say, news of the mosques siege sent waves throughout the royal family. King 
Khaled, Faisal’s successor, is said to have wished the rebels had taken his house instead of 
God’s. He then tasked his defense minister, and interior minister with the reclaiming of the 
mosque. Doing so was not an easy task. Early on the siege, there was precious little information 
about who the men who had taken over the mosque were. Were they rebels? Were they 
terrorists? Were they an attack by a foreign government? No one was sure.  
Thankfully, the religious Ulema of Saudi Arabia were able to provide some answers. One of 
the Ulema’s own had been leading prayers when he was interrupted by Juhayman. He recognized 
his young pupil from long ago and snuck into his office to tell his peers all about him. The 
Ulema were also able to help in another incredibly important matter: taking the mosque back 
over. All good Muslims knew of the moratorium on violence inside the Mosque, so how could 
the Saudi Kingdom retake the mosque? How should his soldiers proceed? The Ulema, somewhat 
embarrassed that Juhayman had come from their stock quickly gave the king permission to do 
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violence in order to protect the lives of the Muslims still in the Mosque and then stood by to 
advise the King on how to destroy the man who not too long ago they had called a missionary.92 
The Saudi forces wanted to waste no time in retaking the mosque. As soon as they had their 
permission they sent their forces in but Juhayman’s forces were waiting and ready. They opened 
fire and cut down the first Saudi attack. Next a battalion of paratroopers arrived. The princes 
insisted they too go in immediately. The commander asked for more time, perhaps darkness so 
they could use flood lights to help blind the defenders. His superiors reprimanded him swiftly 
and sent him in. What did death matter when it meant martyrdom? The commander followed his 
superior’s orders and met his end alongside his soldiers at the mosque. This victory played even 
more into Juhayman’s hands. He had claimed that an army would come from the north and be 
devoured by angels and suddenly his angels had destroyed an army of paratroopers from the 
north of Saudi Arabia.93 
Finally the Ulema spoke with more than just a simple granting of permission. They came out 
publically issued a verdict citing the Quran saying “Do not fight them within the sacred Mosque 
until they fight you in it. But if they do fight you, then slay them; such is the recompense of the 
unbelievers.”94 But they also knew, from their own personal experience that these men were not 
unbelievers. So how could they use this piece of the Quran to justify violence against them? 
They simply said that even though these parts of the Quran were meant to specifically speak 
about non-Muslims, it can also include those who act like them. Despite all of the death, 
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violence, and claims of the Mahdi the Ulema were unwilling to call the rebels anything but 
Muslim. 
While not the strongest in its language, the Ulema’s ruling gave the government what it 
wanted: permission to use whatever means necessary to clear the enemy out of the mosque. They 
started at night this time. They first sent a vehicle around the mosque asking for surrender and 
when there was no response they opened fire upon the mosque with considerable force. They 
utilized weapons that had come as part of their deals with the United States and put their soldiers 
into the mosque. The fighting was fierce but eventually the superior arms of the Saudi military 
prevailed, Juhayman and his followers had been pushed into a corner of the mosque’s basements 
and teargas eventually brought them out. The prisoners were executed across the Kingdom, there 
would be no doubt that the Al-Saud family still ruled here.95 
VI. The Aftermath 
 While it took an embarrassingly long time to quell this uprising the Saudi government with 
the help of European equipment eventually defeated and executed Juhayman and his followers. 
But they did so at a great cost to their own political strength. The Mosque was a holy site of 
Islam, known specifically for its powers to bring peace among warring tribes. To shed blood 
inside the mosque would be a massive offense. The royal family needed religious authorities to 
allow them to use weapons to clear the mosque. And while they were given that permission, the 
mere act of asking demonstrated the massive power that religious scholars or Ulema of Saudi 
Arabia could wield.  
                                                 




These rebels had clear and direct ties to the Ikhwan generations before them. They too saw 
themselves as rightly guided and rebelling against the inherently lazy ways of the Saudi family. 
Their legacy and the legacy of religious extremist from which Saudi Arabia suffers so greatly 
today is the perpetual price the Saudi family must pay for their kingdom. Their country was 
created from Wahhabi principals and at various points in its history those some principals have 
nearly destroyed it.  
Even though the Saudi family was able to quell Juhayman’s rebellion, his act against the 
Saudi Arabian family demonstrated that the Saudi princes were governing over a kingdom that 
required religious legitimacy in order to function. This created a symbiotic relationship between 
the kingdom’s rulers and the religious sheikhs. The sheikhs would keep the princes in power and 
the princes would make sure the sheikhs enjoyed positons of prestige found nowhere else in the 
Arab world.  
By incorporating religious legitimacy guaranteed through the sheikhs the Saudi family was 
able to insure its own regimes survival and continuation for generations, however it also brought 
in a new factor for risk consideration. The generals of Saudi Arabia not only have to ask 
themselves who wants our land or our resources but they also must ask who can disrupt our 
religious power.  
The leaders of Saudi Arabia seem to have come to two answers to this question: Those 
religious extremist sects within their own country, and the Shi’a. Saudi Arabia’s history of 
exploiting religious zealots has also led to Saudi Arabia being forced to put down many of those 




long list of religious zealots produced in Saudi Arabia.96 Zealots like these could use the 
religious cultural identity of Saudi Arabians to fight against the Saudi royal family. As such 
Saudi Arabia has an extensive internal police forced linked with its military in order to combat 
such a threat. This internal police force recognizes (though not publically) the inevitability of 
religious extremism developing in Saudi Arabia, but ensures that the efforts of those groups are 
directed outside of the Kingdom itself. 
The Shi’a, generally through Iran, are also a major threat that the Saudi Arabian military 
must protect against. While Shi’a populations within Saudi Arabia are generally low, they are 
heavily repressed.97  Countries like Iran or Yemeni rebel forces see this repression as an affront 
to Shiism and, so Saudi Arabia believes, seek to disrupt and destabilize the Kingdom. Sometimes 
through official political means in disputes between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other times 
kinetically such as rebel groups attacking Riyadh’s airport.98 
 In order to combat these threats, Saudi Arabia has a developed and modernized military 
force. This military is divided into two categories: conventional military forces and guard units. 
The conventional military units are further divided into an army, an air force, a navy, and a 
strategic missile command.99 The guard forces on the other hand are all infantry or mechanized 
infantry divided into the Royal Guard and the National Guard. All of Saudi Arabia’s military 
units are controlled by the Saudi royal family so there is a degree of civilian control, however, as 
demonstrated by Ibn Saud, the royal family define themselves by their military heritage. 
Moreover, the armed forces are controlled through the ministry of defense whereas the National 
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Guard are controlled through the Ministry of the Guard  each ministry is run by a different 
crowned prince who, breaking with the traditional roles of nepotism in Saudi Arabia, is selected 




















                                                 





 Saudi Arabia is a country fighting against the forces of its own creation. It was built by 
relying upon a shared experience of austerity and religious conservativism that then shed much 
of that identity as political and social change was forced upon it by the discovery of oil and the 
massive amounts of wealth that came from it. 
 Ibn Saud needed the Ikhwan in order to unify his kingdom. Their religious zeal allowed 
him to win battles that would have been otherwise unwinnable and also granted his forces levels 
of freedom of movement that were unmatched in the early 1900s. However, in order to do so he 
needed to find a way to not only create the Ikwhan, but also to bolster their numbers and build 
popular support for himself in neighboring territory. Religious became the perfect solution to all 
of these problems. Through religion, and particularly Wahhabism, Ibn Saud was able to settle a 
great number of the Ikhwan and direct their penchant for raiding and violence towards his own 
enemies. He was also able to use religion in order to build localized resentment against rulers 
that were not himself. 
For the most part, Ibn Saud’s upbringing and lifestyle allowed him to build an image of 
himself as the ideal Wahhabi, one that represented Muslim interests and had familial legitimized 
right to rule. However that same idealization of simplistic lifestyles and the global need to deal 
with foreign powers eventually lead to those same forces that once hailed him as a leader to 
begin to reject Ibn Saud and his policies. The globalizing world forced Ibn Saud to deal and 
make alliances with infidel countries and it forced Ibn Saud to constraint their mission of 
spreading the true form of Islam through violence to all Muslims.  
And with the discovery of oil, the massive influx of wealth helped to save the country 




worked against him as he began to mismanage greater and greater sums of money. This wealth 
worked in direct conflict with the culture of austerity that Ibn Saud had cultivated among his 
people and eventually lead to resentment between those who had wealth and those who did not. 
Ibn Saud’s own lack of understanding of statecraft on such a large scale also helped to widen the 
rift in wealth and prevented any sort of meaningful development programs from starting.  
While Ibn Saud was ultimately able to see to a successful and peaceful transition of 
power, there were already rumblings of conflict within the Kingdom. Protest movements, 
inspired by pan-Arabism, Marxism and socialism had started to spring up in Saudi Arabia and 
each had to be dealt with by the royal family. And while these movements were successful the 
ultimate issues of socio-economic disparity, poor healthcare, and poverty were generally left 
undealt with.  
This dissatisfaction found a home in religion where the wealth of the royal family was 
then transformed into indulgence and allowed religious fanatics to create an enemy of the Al-
Saud family branding them as heretical and simple charlatans who use religion as a  means of 
control as opposed to a way of life. 
This resentment finally reached its peak in the siege of the Great Mosque of Mecca where 
religious extremists took over the mosque in hopes that God’s wrath would then come down and 
cleanse the earth of the Al-Saud family. While no such wrath fell upon the Al-Saud family, the 
price of cleaning up the mess was quite costly. The Saudi family realized that the price of their 
country’s creation was a permanent relationship with the Ulema where the Royal family’s 
political capital would be legitimized through religious authority. By binding their power to the 
Ulema, the Al-Saud family was able to secure its rule for the foreseeable future but because of 




country, it is quite likely that The Kingdom will have to contend with religious extremism for 
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Hegghammer, Thomas, and Stéphane Lacroix. The Meccan rebellion: the story of  
Juhayman al-ʻUtaybi revisited. Bristol, England: Amal Press, 2011.  
 
"History of the Saudi National Guard." Al-Sharaq Al-Awsat. September 11, 2006.  
Accessed Fall 2017. https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/theaawsat/features/history-of-the-
saudi-national-guard.  
 
House, Karen Elliott. On Saudi Arabia: its people, past, religion, fault lines and future.  
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013 
 
Khalifa, Rashad. Quran: the final testament: authorized English version, with the Arabic  
text. Capistrano Beach, CA: Islamic Productions, 2005 
 
"Kingsaud." Http://www.kingsaud.org/. Accessed Winter 2017.  
http://www.kingsaud.org/history/subarticle/new-ministries/1118.  
 
"Kuwait: Anglo-Ottoman Relations 1890-1914." January 1, 1994. Accessed Winter 2017.  
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14230/11/11_chapter%204.pdf.  
 
Lacey, Robert. Inside the kingdom:. London: Arrow, 2010.  
 
Lacey, Robert. The Kingdom: Arabia & the House of Saʻud. New York, NY: Avon, 1983.  
McLoughlin, Leslie J. Ibn Saud: founder of a kingdom. Basingstoke: Macmillan in  
association with St Antonys College, Oxford, 1995.  
 
Missile from Yemen Intercepted near Riyadh Airport." Manila Bulletin, November 5,  
2017. Accessed November 8, 2017. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1- 
513278754.html?refid=easy_hf. 
 




1939-1949. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991 
 
Mubarak, Faisal A. "CULTURAL ADAPTATION TO HOUSING NEEDS: A CASE  




Neild, David. A Soldier in Arabia. Surbiton, Surrey: Medina Publishing, 2015. Rajāyī,  
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